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JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER** 
  Indian occupation of land without government recognition of ownership 
creates no rights against taking or extinction by the United States protected by 
the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law.1 
Justice Stanley Reed 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1955) 
  The juxtaposition of the rule of first (or prior) possession, and the rule of 
conquest builds a deep tension—I am tempted to call it a contradiction— into 
the fabric of private law.2 
Richard A. Epstein 
How should the property law course begin?  The traditional way to start 
the course is to consider the origins of property rights.  Where do they come 
from?  How do unowned objects come to be owned?  What is the original 
source of title?  This way of proceeding seems to make sense.  After all, we 
usually begin at the beginning.  This suggests that we should ask how people 
come to be owners before asking what rights go along with ownership, what 
limits the law places on their rights and the procedures for transferring their 
rights. 
This way of beginning has drawbacks, however.  It is sometimes not good 
to begin at the beginning.  Sometimes the beginning is incomprehensible 
without background information that would help us make sense of what it is 
that is being begun.  Beginning with the origins of property rights may be 
exactly the wrong way to begin a property course.  I do not mean to argue that 
it is inherently wrong to begin property at the beginning.  Rather, I want to 
point out dangers with proceeding in this way and suggest alternative ways to 
start Property. 
 
* 2002 Joseph William Singer. 
** Professor of Law, Harvard University.  Thanks and affection go to Martha Minow, David 
Barron, Mort Horwitz and Duncan Kennedy. 
 1. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955). 
 2. Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims of Indigenous Populations: The View From 
the Common Law, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999). 
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I will begin by reviewing how current property law casebooks begin and 
commenting on the messages these beginnings are likely to convey to students.  
While it is true that most professors do not teach materials in books in the 
exact order in which they appear in those books, it is nonetheless true that the 
organization of a casebook conveys an implicit message about where to start.  I 
will argue that most property casebooks present a partial and arguably 
inaccurate picture of the origins of property rights or at least an inaccurate 
picture of how people acquire property today.  I will then suggest reasons why 
one might choose not to start with original acquisition of property.  I will look 
to contract law and consider the reasons that the legal realists (beginning with 
Lon Fuller’s casebook in 1947) began contracts books at the end by 
considering remedies for breach rather than at the beginning with rules of 
contract formation.  I want to suggest the relevance this procedure might have 
for property law. 
I.  BEGINNING AT THE BEGINNING 
Most casebooks begin at the beginning by considering the original 
acquisition of property.  Almost all books suggest that possession is the root of 
title.  Many do this by beginning with the law of wild animals.  A favorite 
place to start is the old case of Pierson v. Post.3  Although one can derive 
many lessons from this case, it inevitably stands for the proposition that one 
can acquire ownership of a wild (unowned) animal by capturing it.4  Other 
casebooks illustrate the law of first possession by beginning with the law of 
finders.5  Although the traditional rules are complex, they generally teach that 
a finder of an unowned object may keep it while a finder of an object that had a 
prior owner generally must return it either to the owner of the object or the 
owner of the land on which it was found if they seek its return. 
 
 3. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 4. The following casebooks start either with Pierson v. Post or a similar case illustrating the 
law of capture of wild animals: ROGER BERNHARDT, PROPERTY: CASES AND STATUTES (1999); 
BARLOW BURKE, ANN M. BURKHART & R.H. HELMHOLZ, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 
(1999); CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., THOMAS E. KAUPER & PETER W. MARTIN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (3d ed. 
1993); JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998); J. GORDON HYLTON, DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER & PAULA A. FRANZESE, PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1998); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1990); GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE 
A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY (1996). 
 5. The following casebooks start with the law of finders: JAMES L. WINOKUR, AMERICAN 
PROPERTY LAW: CASES, HISTORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE (1982); SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER 
W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MICHAEL BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998). 
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Other casebooks illustrate the rule of first possession by using Johnson v. 
M’Intosh,6 a case that asks us to consider who, exactly, were the first 
possessors of land in the United States.  Whatever interpretation one adopts, 
the case stands for the proposition that first possession is the root of title.  
Under one interpretation, the first possessors of American land were the 
American Indian nations.  According to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in 
Johnson, their original title was transferred to the United States (or prior 
colonial powers).  The U.S. government then transferred title to particular lots 
to individual title holders.  This story vindicates the law of first possession, 
although it also injects a dissonant note into the story; after all, the original title 
of the tribes was taken in a problematic procedure known as conquest—a 
procedure that failed adequately to protect the rights of first possessors by 
taking property from them against their will.  Nonetheless, conquest had the 
effect of lawfully (although unjustly) transferring property rights from first 
possessors to a subsequent set of possessors.7 
Under an alternative interpretation, Johnson may be used to present the 
argument, accepted by John Locke8 but not by Chief Justice John Marshall,9 
that the Indians were actually not the first possessors of land in the United 
States.  The tribes arguably did not “possess” the land because they did not 
enclose it, improve it occupy it, or otherwise treat it as something they owned 
and which therefore was reduced to private property.10  Under this view, when 
the Europeans came, the land was unpossessed; thus the Europeans were the 
first possessors.  This story justifies rather than problematizes conquest; it 
suggests that the colonial powers “captured” or possessed lands that had 
previously been, if not vacant, unclaimed.  Like the first interpretation, it 
 
 6. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 7. The following casebooks start with Johnson v. M’Intosh: RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY (2d ed. 1999); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, 
PROPERTY (4th ed. 1998); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND  
PRACTICES (3d ed. 2002). 
 8. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 29 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
1952) (1690) (“Thus in the beginning all the world was America.”). See Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal 
Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1983), quoted in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 
16-17. 
[Locke] reasoned that the Indians’ occupancy of their aboriginal lands did not involve an 
adequate amount of ‘labor’ to perfect a ‘property’ interest in the soil.  His argument 
helped frame and direct later debates in colonial America on the natural rights of 
European agriculturalists to dispossess tribal societies of their land base. 
Id. 
 9. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588 (“We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, 
merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the 
territory they possess, or to contract their limit.”). 
 10. For a Supreme Court opinion that accepts this implausible and discriminatory view, see 
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States 348 U.S. 272, 272 (1955). 
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vindicates the idea of first possession.  This theme is buttressed by the fact that 
most books that begin with Johnson quickly turn to Pierson or its equivalent to 
emphasize the idea that possession is what matters in establishing original title. 
The possession theme is further strengthened in most casebooks by placing 
the law of adverse possession near the front of the book.  Although this topic 
does not concern original possession, it suggests that if an owner effectively 
abandons her own property by not using it or by allowing occupation of that 
land by another, the law will vest ownership in the one who “possesses” the 
property, even if (or perhaps precisely because) the possession was wrongful. 
Teaching adverse possession near (or after) Johnson may similarly convey the 
message that, wrong as conquest may have been, the subsequent, long standing 
possession of Indian lands by the United States has in fact vested legitimate 
property rights in the U.S. and the non-Indians to whom it granted tribal lands. 
Alternatives to possession as a source of initial acquisition are often 
presented in property casebooks.  Those in greatest use are labor and 
investment.  Pierson itself is often used to illustrate the proposition that those 
who work to capture an animal get to keep the animal as their own.  This 
principle rewards work and investment while distinguishing between those 
whose labor successfully results in production of property (those who capture 
and subdue the fox) and those whose labor was not fruitful (those who chased 
in vain).  Some books include International News Service v. Associated Press11 
or similar cases in the introductory materials to illustrate the way in which the 
law of unfair competition protects property rights by preventing the theft of 
intellectual property.12 
Beginning the property course with the origins of ownership and 
answering the question of ownership by reference to possession and/or labor 
may suggest that individuals deserve the property they have acquired.  The 
only thing left to discuss is the scope of the rights they have as owners and the 
means by which they may transfer those rights.  This message may be justified 
by a Lockean theory of rights that justifies property as deserved when it is 
based on “mixing one’s labor”13 with unowned objects or by a Benthamite 
utilitarian theory that recognizes the social benefits of assigning individuals 
control of property in some manner.14  Conquest provides a troubling aspect to 
the actual historical record in the United States,15 but it is generally presented 
 
 11. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 12. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 62. 
 13. LOCKE, supra note 8, at 17. 
 14. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION  (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789).  See also JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1863). 
 15. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7 (observing that “the ongoing history of relations 
between Native Americans and the U.S. government has not been a very happy one”). 
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as something unfortunate that happened in the past and does not have “much 
immediate relevance today.”16 
It is possible, of course, to teach the same material in very different ways.  
One may start a property law course with issues of possession, labor or 
conquest and ask critical questions about them.  One might emphasize, for 
example, that the possessory rights of Indian nations were not uniformly 
respected.17  Conquest as a source of property rights suggests that property has 
an unjust origin in American history.  Similarly, one might note that most 
African Americans did not own the product of their own labor and were 
themselves owned by others.  Even when freed, they were never compensated 
for hundreds of years of uncompensated labor.18  In a similar vein, one might 
call attention to the fact that much of the work performed by women has been 
inside the home and has been done “for free” such that their labor did not 
generate property rights for themselves.19 
It is also possible to teach that old favorite, Pierson v. Post, in a manner 
that de-emphasizes the idea of possession as the root of title.  For example, the 
case raises the issue of interference by one person with the other’s pursuit of 
the fox.  Was the original pursuer entitled to be left alone in his pursuit once 
the second hunter noticed him closing in on the fox?  The second hunter was 
arguably engaged in a form of unfair competition.  This message might be 
strengthened by following Pierson with International News Service.  This 
approach emphasizes the relational aspects of the cases.  From this perspective, 
the question is not about the relationship between the hunter and the prey (the 
laborer or possessor and the object) but between the two hunters (or two news 
gatherers).  What constitutes fair competition and what distinguishes it from 
unfair competition?  Unfair competition can be understood as a form of theft 
that deprives the victim of property rights that rightly should belong to her.  
Viewed in this light, Pierson is not about the means of original acquisition but 
rather concerns social relationships.  What are the basic ground rules of social 
 
 16. Id. at 12.  Alternatively, Dukeminier and Krier note the argument made by Locke, as 
well as others, that the Indians did not sufficiently work the land or possess it so as to establish 
legitimate property rights.  Id. at 16-17.  In that sense, the land may have been viewed as 
unowned and open for first possession by the European conquerors. 
 17. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).  See also Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The 
Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481 (1994) 
[hereinafter Singer, Well Settled]. 
 18. RANDALL N. ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES BLACKS (2000). 
 19. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ 
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994).  See also Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job 
Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979); 
Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000); JOAN R. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). 
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interaction and interpersonal respect that will govern our pursuit of our 
objects?20 
Adopting either a critical or a relational approach to the subject is helpful 
because it draws students’ attention to issues that are problematic to the basic 
assumptions underlying possession and labor as true and legitimate original 
sources of property.  I want to suggest that it is important for teachers of 
property law to help students learn to question the assumption that most 
property rights originate in an act of possession of previously unowned 
property or in an act of labor that creates value for the first time.  Both the 
labor and possession theories portray property as unproblematic and 
presumptively legitimate.  The possession of an owned object and the mixing 
of one’s labor with such an object appear to be acts that not only harm no one 
else but benefit others by creating things of value.21  Recognizing property 
rights in such legitimately created objects thus seems both fair and efficient; it 
rewards effort and grants incentives to create value.  A relational or critical 
approach brings to light defects in this way of thinking.  It brings to light the 
fact that possessory acts are not self-regarding; they involve claims that others 
should defer to the possessor’s power over the thing even if those others need 
what the possessor grabbed.22  Property involves relations among people, not 
relations between people and things. 
Why is it important to question the notion of possession as the root of title?  
The first, and most significant problem with presenting possession as the 
source of title is that it is almost certainly not true today that most property 
rights have their origin either in possession of unowned objects or in the act of 
mixing one’s labor with such objects.  There is no land left in the United States 
that is not owned by someone.  Additionally, there are few items of personal 
property lying around ready to be seized by those who are vigilant or 
resourceful enough to “hunt” and capture them.  The very irrelevance of the 
law of wild animals to the day-to-day life of most Americans suggests that we 
must look far afield to find examples of unowned objects that come to be 
owned by individual capture.  Indeed, even the ruling of Pierson is suspect 
when one recognizes that the case rested on the proposition that the hunt was 
taking place on supposedly unowned land.  Today if the hunt were to take 
place on land owned by someone else, one would not be rewarded with 
ownership of the fox if one were trespassing.  Moreover, if one were on the 
land with permission of the landowner, then ownership of the fox would be 
 
 20. The approach in this paragraph is based on a conversation with David Barron. 
 21. For an argument that the establishment of individual property rights by individual action 
without the consent of others does impose costs on others, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). 
 22. See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1033 (1996); WALDRON, supra note 21. 
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determined by the scope of permission granted by the landowner to the hunter.  
If the owner allowed the hunter to hunt on the owner’s land and keep whatever 
he could capture or kill, then ownership would go to the hunter.  However, if 
the arrangement did not allow hunting or did not include permission to take 
animals found on the land, then ownership would not go to the hunter who shot 
an animal on the land. 
The problem is not only that possession is not the most important source of 
original title today, but also that possession has historically never been the only 
source of title.  This is not to say that possession is not and never was 
important.  It is to say that possession is only one of a number of major sources 
of original title.  While the importance of labor and investment has already 
been noted, it is important to note that labor and investment take place in the 
context of previously assigned property rights in the objects being manipulated 
by that labor or investment.  Prior to such manipulation, a social decision is 
necessary to determine who owns the materials being made into a valuable 
object, just as a decision must be made as to who owns the land on which the 
work is to be performed.  The source of title may have been the original 
possession of land by American Indian nations.  However, the process of 
conquest in the United States generally took the form of transfers of land from 
Indian nations to the United States for which some, perhaps inadequate, 
compensation was given.  Once title was in the hands of the United States, it 
issued patents to individuals.  The original source of almost all land titles in the 
United States is therefore the government of the United States itself.  While we 
may entertain romantic notions of settlers going into the wilderness, staking 
claims on land, possessing it, and opening up the wilderness, their property 
rights were only lawful when the United States actually gave them title. 
People who work have to work somewhere.  They either work on their 
own land or they work for an employer that owns or leases land.  Therefore, 
the contexts of work and labor take place against the backdrop of land 
ownership that originates in a government grant.  Moreover, no one works 
completely alone.  Even self-employed persons need to obtain materials with 
which to work, requiring food and shelter to sustain them in the meantime.  
Work, therefore, takes place against a backdrop of contract.  In addition, the 
majority who are not self-employed either work for someone else or hire others 
to work for them.  Work also takes place in the context of relationships with 
others.  These relationships have legal consequences that are determined by the 
law of contract and employment regulation.  This picture places the contract 
system at the center of the work and investment saga. 
The contracts system includes law, incorporating rules that determine 
when and how contracts will be enforced.  Sometimes the law provides 
remedies for breach of contract to protect the reliance interests of those to 
whom promises were made, creating property rights in expectations.  At other 
times, the law provides few or no remedies for breach of contract, effectively 
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protecting the autonomy interests of those who change their minds after 
making a promise.  Contract law balances the security interests of promisees in 
relying on promises against the freedom of action interests of promisors in 
having the ability to change their minds and escape obligations that have 
become onerous. 
Thus, work does not create property by itself.  It creates property in 
conjunction with contractual agreements.  Those agreements, in turn, are 
regulated and given (or not given) effect by legal rules that determine the 
balance of power between the parties to consensual relationships.  The state, in 
conjunction with the individual parties, determines the contours of those 
relationships.  This means that, in addition to possession and labor, we must 
add both governmental grants and contracts as major sources of original title to 
property. 
Another major source of original title to property is the family.  Property 
rights originate, for many people, in parental support, inheritance and marriage 
or equivalent relationships.  One might argue that such relationships do not 
involve “original” title.  After all, they do involve transfers of property from 
husbands to wives (and vice versa) and from parents to children.  Such 
arrangements, however, do create original title in the sense that it is not a 
forgone conclusion that owners of property have the right to pass the property 
along to their descendants.  It was the parents who either “possessed” the land, 
“captured” the fox or performed the “work” or “investment” that created the 
wealth that gets transmitted to the children.  From the children’s standpoint, 
the source of their property is their parents.  The children have not engaged in 
their own acts of possession or labor such that they would deserve original 
ownership of the property.  Some legal scholars, including John Chipman 
Gray, have argued that the transmission of inherited wealth is sometimes 
harmful to children because it saps them of their own initiative.23 
In any event, the family relationship creates a context for the creation and 
transmission of property rights that is far more important today in determining 
the distribution of wealth in the United States than is the ability to capture a 
wild animal on unoccupied land.  Moreover, inheritance is a far more 
problematic source of wealth than either possession or labor.  If inheritance is a 
major source of wealth, and if the children of wealthy families are more likely 
to be “well off” than are the children of poor families, then property is 
distributed on the basis of inherited family status rather than individual merit—
a problematic conclusion given American values. 
If possession is not the main way people acquire property, we might begin 
the property course by conveying the idea that property comes from multiple 
 
 23. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-
1914, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 303 (1987).  For a recent argument against unlimited inheritance, see 
Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990). 
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sources.  While these sources include possession and labor, they also include 
conquest, government grant, family (including parental support, inheritance, 
marriage and nonmarital partnerships), gift and contract.  A number of 
property casebooks do this quite well.  Richard Chused’s casebook,24 for 
example, which begins by discussing Johnson and adverse possession law, 
proceeds immediately to a discussion of family property (with an introduction 
to ownership forms available to unmarried partners), and then proceeds to 
address inheritance, wills, gifts and business property.  Beginning a discussion 
of property law in this way gives a contemporary context as well as a more 
accurate picture about the ways in which property is acquired today.  I have 
similarly attempted to do this in my own casebook by presenting the concepts 
of conquest, government grant, family, gift, possession and transfer as 
alternative sources of ownership rights.25 
II.  BEGINNING AT THE END 
Presenting a variety of sources of title of property responds to the factual 
and normative inadequacies of the current possession model.  However, the 
model fails to respond to another major problem.  Beginning with the original 
acquisition of title assumes that students have some sense of what property is 
and what it means to have title to it.  This assumes that we can sensibly 
adjudicate a dispute between competing claimants to title without first 
understanding what it would mean for one of them to win.  If one party gets 
title, what rights exactly will they be getting? 
This discussion presents a problem because granting title to one of the 
parties will not necessarily end the case.  The fact that one is a titleholder does 
not necessarily mean one will win a dispute with a non-titleholder.  If this were 
true, the property law casebooks would be rather short.  We would have rules 
about initial acquisition, such as inheritance laws, information about the 
recording system and the procedures for transfer, but not much else.  In fact, 
the property law casebooks are chock full of rules that limit the rights of 
owners in order to protect the legitimate interests of both non-owners and the 
community.  In many property law casebooks, the majority of the cases 
describe situations in which the titleholders lose.  They lose because title is not 
everything.  Moreover, there are good reasons to limit the rights of titleholders.  
For example, ownership rights must be limited to protect the rights of other 
owners, of non-owners and of the public as a whole.26 
The problem is that students are likely to have the intuitive conception that 
property rights are absolute.27  They are also likely to think that ownership is 
 
 24. CHUSED, supra note 7. 
 25. SINGER, supra note 7. 
 26. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000). 
 27. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 22. 
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defined by title.  If a case involves a choice of competing owners, their views 
about its appropriate resolution are likely to be heavily influenced by the fact 
that they assume that whoever wins will have absolute control over the 
property.  If, on the other hand, they understood that property rights are often 
limited to protect the legitimate interests of others, including the interests of 
non-owners, they would recognize that they could protect the legitimate 
interests of a particular party even if that party is not assigned title. 
An alternative way to start the property course is to skip the question of 
initial acquisition altogether.  Instead, we could start in the thick of things by 
addressing problems involved with property that is indisputedly owned by 
someone but whose use or transfer causes a conflict with the legitimate 
interests of others.  We could begin, in other words, with conflicts between 
owners or between owners and non-owners.28  A number of casebooks begin 
with cases that illustrate the fact that property rights are limited by the rights of 
other owners and by the legal rights of non-owners.  The Fundamentals of 
Modern Property Law by Edward H. Rabin, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and 
Jeffrey L. Kwall,29 for example, begins by discussing the law of trespass, 
considering the limits of the right to exclude.  It then proceeds to examine 
leaseholds and the estates system.  The new edition of the Casner and Leach 
casebook by Susan Fletcher French, Gerald Korngold and Lea VanderVelde 
similarly begins with the right to exclude and limits to that right before 
proceeding to the law of wild animals and finders.30 
Some casebooks take an alternative route.  They include material on initial 
acquisition near the beginning of the book but introduce those legal issues by 
an extensive survey of alternative philosophical approaches to thinking about 
the meaning of property as both an individual right and a social institution.  
Examples include Property: Land Ownership and Use by Curtis Berger and 
Joan Williams31 and Property Law and Policy: A Comparative Institutional 
Perspective by John Dwyer and Peter Menell.32 
 
 28. The following books start with conflicts over property rights rather than issues of initial 
acquisition: JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN 
PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 1999) (beginning discussion of book with leaseholds); JOHN E. 
CRIBBET, CORWIN W. JOHNSON, ROGER W. FINDLEY & ERNEST E. SMITH, PROPERTY (7th ed. 
1996) (discussing first the right to exclude); EDWARD H. RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL 
& JEFFREY L. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 2000) (discussing 
first the right to exclude). 
 29. RABIN ET AL., supra note 28. 
 30. A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (4th ed. 
2000). 
 31. CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (4th 
ed. 1997). 
 32. DWYER &  MENELL, supra note 4. 
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In 1947, Lon Fuller revolutionized contracts casebooks by beginning at the 
end.33  Instead of asking how contracts are formed, he began Basic Contract 
Law by addressing remedies.34  This procedure seems backwards.  It would 
seem more natural to ask how contracts get formed (rules of offer and 
acceptance, consideration, promissory estoppel), then to address questions of 
interpretation and regulation of contract terms and then, finally, look to the 
remedies for breach.  Yet, Fuller reversed this seemingly natural, chronological 
order, beginning with disputes over breach and asking how courts should 
respond to those breaches.  Why did he do this? 
There are several reasons.  First, Fuller was a legal realist and he wanted 
students to understand the consequences of finding something to be an 
enforceable contract before they considered whether a particular set of actions 
created such an agreement.  Fuller wanted to avoid asking an abstract question 
of whether a “contract” was formed.  He thought we should think 
pragmatically about this question.  Like Felix Cohen, he viewed the question 
of whether a “contract” had been made as a form of transcendental nonsense.35  
A pragmatist would ask: Why do we want to know whether there was a 
“contract”?  The answer is that we want to know the answer to this question to 
determine whether a court will or should respond to a breach of a promise by 
imposing a remedy, either ordering someone to do what she promised to do or 
ordering her to pay damages in lieu of performance.  The question is not a 
metaphysical one about whether something called a “contract” actually 
“exists.”  There is no Platonic form of a contract out there in the world that we 
are trying to match.  People make all kinds of agreements and only some of 
them are enforced by courts.  We are interested in knowing which 
commitments, under which circumstances, will or should result in a court using 
its power to coerce individuals either to perform or pay damages for 
nonperformance. 
This legal realist outlook suggests that we see rights and remedies as 
linked.36  More precisely, this outlook sees remedies as occurring prior to 
rights, since rights are defined by the scope of the remedies the law will grant 
to right-holders.  A right without a remedy is not a right. Consider that contract 
law generally does not impose a remedy of specific performance.  Courts 
usually do not require individuals to do what they promised to do.  This is 
because, although we value the right to rely on promises made by others, we 
 
 33. LON FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1947) (beginning with discussion of general 
scope of legal protection accorded contracts). 
 34. For a history of contracts casebooks and their relation to legal realism, see Karl Klare, 
Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979). 
 35. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809 (1935). 
 36. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 184 
(1992). 
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also value the right to change one’s mind.  We may create a property right in 
expectations and force promisors to keep their promises.  However, this 
property right would often unduly interfere with the autonomy of the promisor, 
turning her into an indentured servant.  Because we value autonomy, as well as 
property, the courts often refuse to grant specific performance.  Instead, the 
usual remedy for breach of contract is damages.  Moreover, those damages are 
often low.  The courts impose an obligation on promisees to “cover” or 
otherwise mitigate damages.  They do this for a variety of reasons.  One 
reason, again, is that individuals who can costlessly cover have not been 
actually harmed by the breach and therefore have lost no property interests.  If 
the promisee can costlessly cover and the promisor has strong financial or 
autonomy interests in changing her mind, then both fairness and efficiency 
may be promoted by allowing the promisor to breach. 
If the law will not impose a remedy when one breaches a contract, it does 
no good to say that you have a “right” to have the contract enforced.  The fact 
of the matter, according to a legal realist, is that you are legally free to breach 
the contract without penalty.  If there is no remedy, then you have no right.  If 
there is no penalty for breach, you are free to breach.  It is misleading to talk 
about the “right to contract” without understanding that this right entails a 
choice between those situations in which the courts will protect the 
expectations of the promisee by enforcing the contract in some way and those 
situations in which the courts will not do so, effectively granting individuals 
the freedom both to make, and to break, contracts. 
A second reason Fuller began with remedies is that students were likely to 
believe that a regime of contract entails enforcement of promises.  They might 
even think that such enforcement would naturally take the form of forcing you 
to do what you promised to do. They might be reluctant to conclude, however, 
that someone should be forced to do what they promised to do.  For example, 
suppose I accept an offer of admission to Boston University School of Law and 
am subsequently admitted to Boston College Law School where I would prefer 
to go.  I decide to forfeit my deposit at BU and accept the offer at BC.  BU 
then sues me, seeking an injunction ordering me to attend BU on the ground 
that, by accepting the offer of admission, I promised to attend.  It violates 
norms of autonomy—not to mention the Thirteenth Amendment—to think of 
courts forcing people to take jobs they do not want to take.  If I believe that 
contract enforcement entails making people do what they promised to do, and 
if I believe this sometimes interferes with legitimate interests in freedom of 
action, I might be inclined to conclude that there was no enforceable contract 
between BU and myself.  If, on the other hand, I recognize that contract 
enforcement might take the form of damages and that such damages might be 
limited to the amount of a reasonable deposit that would allow me still to 
attend BC while protecting the financial interests of BU, I would not be so 
averse to finding an enforceable agreement to attend BU. 
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Knowing the consequences of finding an agreement to have been made 
may therefore influence one’s willingness to find that such an agreement was 
actually made.  Learning about remedies before learning about offer and 
acceptance may therefore affect students’ views about whether to conclude that 
a contract was or was not made.  Of course, it is possible to start a contracts 
course with contract formation and be sensitive to these issues.  No doctrinal 
area will be fully comprehensible in isolation of others in the same (and even 
other) fields.  There may even be other reasons for starting with contract 
formation, such as the fact that students have long been confused by contracts 
courses that start with remedies and may prefer to start with contract 
formation.  Nonetheless, the point is that students’ misconceptions about 
remedies may cause them to misperceive the choice actually presented in a 
case that raises the question of whether an enforceable commitment was made.  
The legal realist approach suggests that, from the very beginning, students 
should be confronted with the fact that choices must be made among 
alternative possible rules of contract and property law and that those choices 
implicate multiple and conflicting values. 
III.  BEGINNING IN THE MIDDLE 
Just as students’ misconceptions about remedies may cause them to 
misunderstand the actual issues in contract formation cases, students’ 
misconceptions about the absoluteness of property rights may cause them to 
misperceive the issues at stake in cases of property acquisition.  My casebook 
begins with the question of original acquisition because many professors seem 
to want to start there.  I have adopted the approach of multiplying the sources 
of property rights.  However, when I teach the course I begin my class with 
chapter 2 of my casebook.  Like the Rabin, Kwall and Kwall casebook37 and 
the Casner, Leach, French, Korngold and VanderVelde casebook,38 I begin my 
course with the law of trespass and limits on the right to exclude designed to 
promote rights of access.  I do this because I know students misperceive 
property rights as absolute and this misconception is likely to distort their 
understanding of the issues presented by property law disputes. 
I begin my course neither at the beginning nor the end but in the middle.  I 
begin not with original acquisition and not with remedies, but with disputes 
among owners and between owners and non-owners.  My procedure is to 
introduce the students to the major rights, powers, privileges and immunities 
that may go along with ownership and to do so in the context of conflicts that 
arise in each of those areas.  I begin with the right to exclude (trespass) and 
limits to that right (public accommodations law).  I then move to the privilege 
to use property and limits to that right (nuisance).  Then I cover immunity 
 
 37. See RABIN ET AL., supra note 29. 
 38. See CASNER & BARTON, supra note 30. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
578 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:565 
rights (the right not to have property taken from you without your consent) and 
limits to that right (adverse possession).  Finally, I move to the power to 
transfer property and the substantial limits the legal system places on that right, 
including the regulation the law imposes on transfers of property rights through 
the law of servitudes, future interests, concurrent ownership rights, real estate 
transactions, leaseholds, fair housing law and real estate finance. 
In each area, the goal is to introduce the students to conflicts that arise 
among owners, between owners and non-owners and between owners and the 
community.  These conflicts ordinarily present legitimate interests on both 
sides and demonstrate the policies applicable to determining how to draw the 
line between competing interests and conflicting legal rights.  Once the 
students understand the conflicts that arise, the fact situations in which they are 
likely to appear and the policies relevant to choosing alternative resolutions, 
they are likely to have a much more complex picture of what it means to have 
a private property system and the legitimate scope of rights that accompany 
ownership.  They are more likely to understand the concepts of property and 
property law as embodying choices, value conflicts, and tensions.  Such a 
sophisticated understanding will allow better understanding of what is at stake 
in the construction of the rules of property law. 
In my own courses, because of limited time, I never get back to the issue of 
original acquisition.  I address tribal property rights as contemporary questions, 
teaching the forms of title available to tribes and how they differ from the 
estates available in the non-Indian context.  I also compare the application of 
the takings clause in the Indian and non-Indian context.  Issues of possession 
are covered in the materials on adverse possession and, if I have enough time 
to cover it, I present a unit on personal property that would include the law of 
gifts and finders.  Issues of work and investment are covered throughout the 
course or in a separate unit on intellectual property. 
In effect, I begin and end in the middle.  This way of organizing the course 
makes takings law quite problematic.  If the takings clause prohibits the state 
from taking “property” without just compensation, and if “property” entails 
choices between competing interests and competing rights, then it becomes 
hard to say what is or should be an unconstitutional taking of property.  This is 
as it should be.  To find something to be a taking, one must conclude that the 
law, as applied to an owner, works a fundamental injustice rather than a choice 
between equally legitimate constructions of property.  Given the number of 
choices that must be made to define property, the takings clause should have 
few applications.  It should also be a difficult doctrine to apply because 
property rights are difficult rights to define. 
IV.  ENDING AT THE BEGINNING 
In an article on beginnings, I should probably say something about 
endings.  In recent years, I have ended my property course by introducing the 
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subject of American Indian tribal property, generally focusing on takings 
issues.  I do this because this makes the contrast between Indian and non-
Indian law especially stark.  After learning numerous ways in which the law 
protects property rights, it comes as something of a shock for students to learn 
how United States law has treated Indian Nations.  Protections routinely 
granted to non-Indian owners have, at times, been denied to Indian nations.39  
The origins of property in the United States appear not so benign when one 
considers the reality of conquest after all the hoary rhetoric deployed to protect 
the interests of non-Indian owners. 
Nor is the problem merely an historical observation about the past.  Recent 
Supreme Court cases have, in my opinion, often failed to provide equal 
protection to Indian nations by denying them protection for property rights that 
would have been recognized and protected in the non-Indian context.40  In 
addition, treaties with Indian Nations have been given short shrift or ignored 
entirely in recent Supreme Court decisions.41 
I end, rather than begin, with these cases because students are likely to 
assume that conquest was a terrible thing but that it happened a long time ago 
and has no contemporary relevance.  Tribes own a substantial amount of land 
in the United States and continue to litigate issues regarding both sovereignty 
and property.  Treating these issues at the end of the course allows students to 
consider how the contemporary cases involving Indian land claims would be 
resolved under the law applicable to non-Indians.  They may then consider 
whether such principles are also applied in the Indian context.  Sometimes the 
special rules of Indian law are deployed to give the benefit of the doubt to 
Indian nations.  Often, however, the opposite has been the case. 
Property in the United States originates in various acts of conquest.  This is 
an uncomfortable truth.  We might like to treat this fact as an unfortunate 
aspect of an era that is past; we might like to believe that we have gotten 
beyond all that.  It turns out, however, that the past is never past.  We deal 
 
 39. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that 
original Indian title is not “property” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment). 
 40. Compare County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (finding 
a property claim in a tribe whose land was unlawfully taken by New York in the 1790s) with 
Blatchford v. Native Vill. & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775 (1991); and Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that tribes may not sue states in federal court to quiet title to tribal 
land wrongfully taken by the state) and Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, No. 80-CV-930, 80-
CV-960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10579 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1999) (denying the remedy of 
ejectment for the wrongful taking of Cayuga lands by New York) and State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 
210 (Vt. 1992) (holding, contrary to federal Indian law, that Abenaki lands were lost through the 
“increasing weight of history”).  But see Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (holding in a 
5-4 vote that Idaho had wrongfully occupied tribal lands in a case brought by the United States 
rather than by a tribe).  See also Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (1991); Singer, Well Settled, supra  note 17. 
 41. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
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today with the consequences of that history.  Such concerns are relevant, for 
example, to recent claims for reparations for African Americans who look to 
litigation granting back pay to slave laborers in the Nazi era in Germany and 
who ask why such compensation is not forthcoming to them.  Understanding 
the justice and injustice of origins of property is crucial to understanding 
whether we do, or do not, have an answer to this question. 
 
